Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice by Meares, Tracey L.
Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness
and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice
Tracey L. Meares*
The Warren Court's work is justly celebrated, for who would not support the
right to counsel for indigent defendants or the requirement that an arrested person
be informed of her right to counsel, including appointed counsel if she could not
afford one? Nonetheless, it is useful to recall the regime replaced by selective
incorporation, the method by which the Warren Court established its body of
constitutional criminal procedure. In the early days of constitutional criminal
procedure, the Supreme Court relied upon notions offundamental fairness in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to review state court criminal
judgments. While it is true that those early decisions were too weak to engineer
widespread reform of the state criminal justice processes, it is also true that
fundamental fairness jurisprudence had notably positive features. In particular,
fundamental fairness jurisprudence was replete with references to what I call a
"public-regarding" vision offairness. This notion importantly includes the public,
as well as the defendant, in the articulation of constitutional values relevant to the
fair operation of criminal justice. Moreover, the decisions articulating these views
considered racial injustice as part and parcel of constitutional review. While the
Warren Court 's approach led to reform of state criminal justice, that reform came
at a cost. The Warren Court's selective incorporation approach did not admit of
the candid evaluation of various aspects and practices of the states that
fundamental fairness analysis did. The focus on fundamental fairness captured
society's normative aspirations and provided a primer on fair treatment of
citizens. To illustrate the potential of fundamental fairness analysis to address
lingering vestiges of racial injustice in the criminal justice system, I focus on two
problem areas that often implicate race-petit jury composition and selective
prosecution claims.
In a retrospective of the Warren Court's work one must first celebrate. Under
Chief Justice Earl Warren's leadership the Supreme Court rewrote the corpus of
constitutional law-especially in the criminal procedure arena. Leaving aside for
the moment the particular doctrinal foundations of the Warren Court's work, the
outcomes of the Court's decisions are justly applauded, for who would not support
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the right to counsel for indigent defendants' or the requirement that an arrested
person be informed of her right to counsel prior to any interrogation, including
appointed counsel if she could not afford one?2 So here and now let me join the
chorus of those who claim that the Warren Court's creative work rivals that of the
eighteenth century Marshall Court's in scope and in vision.
A retrospective is also, however, a moment for analysis, introspection,
criticism, and speculation. These tasks are not obviously inconsistent with
celebration, but might be seen as paying inadequate homage to a Court whose
deeds are considered so great. I want to be clear now that my aim in this essay is
not about "what should have been," but rather it is about "what ifs" and "perhaps."
Most particularly, though, the essay is about the way in which an analysis of
history can provide new prospects and pathways for the future.
With this brief preface, I begin my work. My goal is to discuss the
relationship between the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions and modem
perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. This discussion will
unfold in three parts. First, I will sketch some work in social science firmly
establishing what so many of us know intuitively to be true-that perceptions of
fairness are critical to the proper operation of the criminal justice system and that
such perceptions of legitimacy have important instrumental benefits. Second, I
will delve into some history of constitutional criminal procedure. Early criminal
procedure decisions were grounded in an interpretation of fundamental fairness
demanded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These
decisions were replete with references to what I call the "public-regarding" vision
of fairness. 3 Third, I will tie parts one and two together by exploring the
implications for public legitimacy of the criminal justice system of the Warren
Court's choice to develop a code of criminal procedure through incorporation of
the Bill of Rights as opposed to fundamental fairness. In particular, I believe the
prospects for addressing race-related perceptions of criminal justice system
unfairness were limited, somewhat ironically, by the Warren Court's reliance on
selective incorporation as the mechanism for criminal justice system reform.
There is irony here because the Warren Court's criminal procedure cases are
rightly viewed as a branch of "race law." 4 The context that gave rise to modem
criminal procedure was institutionalized racism.5  From the close of
I Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 See Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong With Gideon, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 215 (2003); infra
text accompanying notes 29-41.
4 Harvard professor Charles Ogletree has suggested that much of the Warren Court's
"criminal procedure" reform more properly should be understood as constituting a branch of race
law. Professor Charles Ogletree, Lecture at the American Association of Law Schools Annual
Meeting (Jan. 1990).
5 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997).
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Reconstruction to the modem civil rights revolution, law enforcement played a
central role in maintaining the exclusion of African-Americans and other
minorities from the Nation's political life. When suspected, however remotely, of
wrongdoing, these citizens became the targets of sweeping and invasive tactics of
investigation. And even when not targets, they remained subject to relentless
official intimidation, particularly when they dared to take actions that challenged
the white establishment's stranglehold over political power. Nearly all the
landmark criminal procedure cases of the 1960s and early 1970s arose from this
context.6 Although rarely acknowledged by the Court, the racial dimension of
these cases was not lost on contemporary observers. "The Court's concern with
criminal procedure," one wrote, "can be understood only in the context of the
struggle for civil rights."7 At a time when attacking racial discrimination in public
and private institutions occupied a central place on both the Court's and
Congress's agendas, "[i]t would have been.. . anomalous for [the] Court to ignore
the clear evidence that members of disadvantaged groups generally bore the brunt
of most unlawful police activity" 8 as well.
The fact that the racial dimension of the Warren Court's cases was rarely
mentioned is critical to my argument here. The selective incorporation approach
allowed the Court to effect a revolution without having to pass judgment on state
criminal justice practices, a point about which I will say more below. If the Court
had said more, might there be a more developed jurisprudence of fundamental
fairness today? I cannot answer that question, but I will speculate a bit in part
three about how I believe a beefed-up fundamental fairness doctrine might address
two areas of criminal justice functioning that often implicate race-petit jury
composition and selective prosecution claims.
I. SOCIAL SCIENCE OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
It goes almost without saying that the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system is critical to the system's proper functioning. We can see this by
examining the criminal trial. We use the criminal trial in order to accurately
ascertain whether the accused in fact committed an act deserving of punishment. It
is sometimes said that constitutional criminal procedure guarantees represent a
preference for more accuracy in criminal judgments, as rules that tend to favor the
6 See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
843-44 (1994). Indeed, race also played a critical role in many of the landmark due process
"fundamental fairness" cases decided earlier in the century. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932) (due process right to counsel); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S 278 (1936) (due process
right against coerced confession). See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
94-107 (1997); Bennett Boskey & John H. Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal
Procedure, 13 U. CaL. L. REV. 266, 283-86 (1946).
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defendant are likely on average to reduce false positives.9 But, it is also true that
this sorting function is not the-only, or even the primary, goal of the procedures
that make up a criminal trial.' ° For example, Peter Arenella has noted that criminal
procedure can insure that a suspect is treated with dignity and respect in ways that
capture "society's normative aspirations embodied in its positive laws, customs,
religions, and ideologies and the proper relationship between the individual and the
state."''
Fair process norms are typically promoted as ethical imperatives to be
pursued as goods in and of themselves set apart from their value in reducing
outcome error. Importantly, however, even if procedure is disconnected from the
objective of accurate sorting, fair process norms still can lead to instrumental
benefits. Public confidence in the criminal justice system is one such obvious
benefit. The public is much more likely to support and participate in the criminal
justice process and support those officials who run it when the public believes that
the process is run fairly. If the American public does not perceive its criminal
justice system to be fair, negative consequences can result. Diminished public
support for the criminal justice system, taken to the extreme, can lead to
diminished respect for the law and, thereby, less compliance with the law.' 2
Social science researchers have demonstrated that a person's evaluation of
whether a criminal trial is fair does not depend entirely upon the relationship
between the procedures that make up the trial and the outcome of the trial. It turns
out that people do not typically emphasize the extent to which a procedure leads to
accurate results when assessing whether the procedure is fair. Instead, people are
more likely to evaluate trial procedures as messages to them from the authorities
controlling the procedures. The primary proponents of this view, E. Alan Lind and
9 Of course, this is accuracy of only one type. The same rules that tend to reduce false
positives clearly increase another type of error. They create a higher likelihood that defendants who
are guilty will be acquitted. See Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in
Criminal Law and Procedure-And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 859-80 (making this
point and explaining its relevance to institutional design of criminal justice systems).
'0 The seminal work in this tradition is HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrS OF THE CRimiNAL
SANCTION 153 (1968). Packer divides the criminal justice world into two simplified camps with
different inherent values, which were given effect in two models of justice: the Due Process Model
and the Crime Control Model. The Crime Control Model promotes the importance of making
accurate determinations of guilt or innocence, while the Due Process Model promotes the importance
of observing procedures, even at the expense of allowing guilty defendants to go free.
11 " Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200 (1983); see also Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L.
Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the "Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1267, 1272 (1996) ("[C]riminal trials are a form of civic theater that allows us to define who we
are as a people . . . and provides us with an opportunity to foster our self-confidence in the
fundamental morality of our society.").
12 See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy, and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391
(2000).
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Tom Tyler, call this model the "group value" theory of procedural justice.13 The
basis of the group value model is that people "belong to social groups and that they
are very attentive to signs and symbols that communicate information about their
status within their groups."14 Thus, Lind and Tyler assert that relational concerns,
such as whether a person is treated with dignity, whether the decision-maker is
perceived as neutral, and whether the person subjected to a procedure has trust in a
decision-maker, convey information to the evaluator about her standing in a group
or society. 15 Other researchers have explained that people may rely heavily on the
evaluation of procedures independent of outcomes because procedures are more
"trait-like"16 than outcomes. Outcomes often are variable, or they may be
extremely indeterminate in any particular case. While it may not be obvious how a
particular case should come out, it is almost always clear how parties should
proceed and be treated in that particular case. At the extreme, individuals may
ignore outcomes completely, and focus entirely on the procedures that make up a
trial when evaluating whether the trial is "fair.9
17
This last point drives the relational view of procedural justice. Individuals
care about how they are treated by government authorities because treatment
provides important indicators to individuals about how the authority in question
views the group to which the individual evaluator perceives herself belonging. In
order to make this assessment, individuals key in on three factors: standing,
neutrality and trust.18 By standing, researchers are referring to indications that the
authority recognizes an individual's status and membership in a valued group, such
as polite treatment, and treatment that accords dignity and respect, such as concern
for rights.19 Neutrality refers to indications from an authority's decisions to a
perceiver that do not make the perceiver feel less worthy than others because of
bias, discrimination, and incompetence. 20  Finally, trust refers to the extent to
13 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988).
14 See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 140-41 (Mark P. Zann ed., 1992).
1" See id. at 141.
16 Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and
Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH 390, 404 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
17 Note, however, that in pointing to the "trait-like" aspects of procedures, it is possible that
the preference is not as divorced from outcome as the researchers claim. That is, people may prefer
procedures as a signal of good outcomes. Assuming people aren't sure of the right outcome in the
particular case, good procedures might help them to have more confidence in that outcome. In this
way the procedure is a form of outcome control. Tyler and Lind, by focusing on group value, do
divorce procedure assessment from its effect on outcomes.
18 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 14, at 158-59.
19 See id. at 153 (collecting studies); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria
Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 103, 129 (1988)
(discussing importance of recognition of citizens' rights).
20 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 14, at 157.
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which a perceiver believes that the authority in question will act fairly and
benevolently in the future.2' Of course, individuals making assessments do not
disaggregate their assessments in terms of these factors; rather, they reach
conclusions about authorities by considering information that is relevant to these
factors. Researchers have been able to disaggregate the various factors for
purposes of analysis.
In an extension of this work on procedural justice, Tom Tyler has
demonstrated that individual perceptions of legitimacy are importantly connected
to compliance with the law. Tyler points to normative bases for compliance
rather than instrumental ones. For example, his research looks to the extent to
which an individual's belief that an authority enforcing the law has the right to do
so (Tyler's notion of legitimacy) can predict whether that individual will obey the
law.23 Such a framework is considered normative because an individual who
complies with the law for normative reasons does so because she feels an internal
obligation.24 It is "[t]he suggest[ion] that citizens will voluntarily act against their
self-interest [that] is the key to the social value of normative influences. 25 In
contrast, the individual who complies with the law because she is responding to
externally imposed punishments does so out of fear.
Regulation based on these principles of legitimacy is called "process-based
regulation., 26 The aim of process-based regulation is to encourage the public to
develop trust in the motives of legal authorities. The argument is that when
authorities, through fair and respectful behavior, gain cooperation and consent
from the public, the compliance that follows is more durable than the compliance
obtained through deterrence-enhancing threats.27  The "psychological
jurisprudence" that underlies process-based regulation "begins by taking the
subjective experience of members of the public seriously," as opposed to targeting
wrongdoers whose behavior is to be controlled.28 Developing laws and procedures
of general applicability, then, is the preferred approach to sustained public
confidence. Criminal procedure concerned with legitimacy necessarily will be
public-regarding.
21 See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Democratic Governance, in 1 TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 270
(Margaret Levi & Valerie Braithwaite eds., 1998).
22 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
23 See id. at 3-4.
24 See id. at 24.
25 id.
26 TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 204-08 (2002).
27 See id. at 204.
28 See id. at 213.
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II. LEGITIMACY AND SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
The social science of criminal justice system legitimacy dovetails nicely with
the origins of the Supreme Court's constitutional criminal procedure doctrine. A
quick review of the early cases reveals the Court's preoccupation with public
perceptions of the fairness ofjudicial proceedings.
Beginning in the late 1920s and continuing throughout the 1930s, the Court
began to interpret the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
invalidate state criminal convictions. For example, in Tumey v. Ohio,29 decided in
1927, the Court invalidated a conviction of a defendant accused of violating the
Prohibition Act of the State after a trial by a mayor who was paid for his services
only when he chose to convict. In Powell v. Alabama,30 decided in 1932, the Court
found after reviewing the entire record of the case, that factors such as the
ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public
hostility, the nature of the crime with which they were charged (the gang rape of
two white girls), the inflamed sentiment of the community, and the failure of the
court to appoint counsel resulted in an unfair trial.31  And in 1936, the Supreme
Court invalidated the defendants' convictions by a Mississippi court because the
convictions rested almost entirely on confessions extracted through torture.
In each of these cases the Court made clear that it regarded public perceptions
of the fairness of proceedings as serving a critical function in establishing the
constitutional standards for due process in criminal trials. For example, the Court
found irrelevant in Tumey that the evidence demonstrated quite clearly that the
defendant was guilty of the charge against him; he was nonetheless entitled, the
Court concluded, to an impartial judge in order to satisfy the requirements of due
process.33 An independent adjudicator clearly advances a perception of fairness
even when accuracy is not served in the individual case.34 In procedural justice
terms, an independent adjudicator serves neutrality and trust interests that an
individual before a court, as well as those not currently before the court, might
have. In Brown, the incredible level of physical coercion detailed by the Court
makes concern about the accuracy of the confessions in the case unavoidable.
Still, concern for public-regarding justice is evident in the opinion-a point soon
29 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
30 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
31 Id. at 71.
32 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The deputy sheriff who obtained the
confessions admitted at trial to beating the defendants. He defended his actions on the ground that
the horrific beatings were "[n]ot too much for a Negro." Id. at 284.
13 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535.
34 See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 483-84 (1986) (evaluating non-instrumental values
served by due process and proposing that the appearance of fairness value demands a truly
independent adjudicator).
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made more clear in later cases.35 Torture of a defendant is hardly consistent with
standing values. It does not accord a person dignity, respect or concern for the
person's rights. In Powell, the Court held that Alabama was required to appoint
counsel for the defendants because the right to a lawyer was a "fundamental
principle of liberty and justice which lie[s] at the base of all our civil and political
institutions., 36 The Court went on to hold that the "ends of public justice" required
the trial court to appoint counsel for the defendants "however guilty. '37 Again,
while an accurate determination of guilt clearly constituted an aspect of fair
treatment for the defendants in these cases, that important instrumental goal was
not the only goal to be served by due process. By the Court's lights, the criminal
defendant was not the only relevant stakeholder in determining whether or not a
trial was "fair." In these early cases, the Court deemed the public as well as
criminal defendants to have a critical interest in the fundamental fairness of the
criminal justice system. These ideas are congenial to the procedural justice
literature.
Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter were the greatest proponents of the public-
regarding notion of due process in the criminal procedure context. On several
occasions, Justice Cardozo wrote compellingly about a public-regarding due
process. For example, he noted that a procedure violates due process when its use
violates "a principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked fundamental," 38 and when the procedure subjects a person to "a
hardship so acute and shocking that our polity would not endure it."'39 Similarly
Justice Frankfurter in later cases noted that due process includes procedures
required for the "protection of ultimate decency in a civilized society,' 40 and "a
system of rights based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the tradition and
feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as
conceived by our whole history."4 1 This heady and inspiring language helped to
form the basis of modem criminal procedure.
Inspiring language was not enough to produce wholesale change in the
operation of criminal justice by the states, however. While the values articulated
in the opinions were weighty, the actual regulation of state criminal procedure at
the end of the day was quite light. The due process standards developed by the
Court typically specified a case-by-case review based upon constitutional norms as
35 See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949) (citing Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941), for the proposition that a coerced confession is "inadmissible under the Due
Process Clause even though statements in it may be independently established as true").
36 Powell, 287 U.S. at 67. The same language had previously been quoted in Brown, 279 U.S
at 286.
37 Powell, 287 U.S. at 52, 72.
38 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
39 Id. at 328.
40 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfirter, J., concurring).
41 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950).
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opposed to prophylactic rules. Additionally, the Court's somewhat open-ended
standard-based approach led to criticism that the fundamental fairness doctrine was
simply another name for the personal predilections of individual justices. Justice
Black was an especially emphatic critic, and his criticism provided the groundwork
for major change by the Warren Court with respect to constitutional criminal
procedure.42
As is well-known, one of the most important legacies of the Warren Court is
its abandonment of fundamental fairness as the primary vehicle for the regulation
of criminal procedure. Rather than relying on the Due Process Clause's guarantees
of "ordered liberty" to review state criminal justice procedures, the Warren Court
utilized selective incorporation-the theory that holds that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates and makes applicable to the states
those guarantees of the Bill of Rights deemed to be fundamental.
43
It is not difficult to see why the Bill of Rights was an attractive vehicle for
Chief Justice Warren's vision. By adopting selective incorporation of particular
text-based guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the Court was able to project the Bill of
Rights as a code.44 Codes have a clear advantage over standards if one's goal is to
achieve reform. Codes specify rules, not norms. If one is suspicious of judicial
actors who may be quick to justify established practices in terms of open-ended
fundamental fairness norms, then one might naturally look to lists of sharp-edged
prophylactic prohibitions and requirements that can bring on reform of these
actors' practices.45Note, however, that while the prophylactic and formalistic features of the Bill
of Rights as a code can be an advantage to the reformer, these features can also be
a curse. Rules can be inflexible and crude. Their very prophylactic nature may
create costs in terms of under- and over-inclusiveness. We might conclude that
these costs are justified by the value of reform, but they are costs nonetheless.
Consider the "code" of criminal procedure that the Warren Court established (and
subsequent Courts extended). While the Warren Court's initial decisions
purported to incorporate only the principles of the incorporated guarantee to the
states, in later cases the Court also began to apply the relevant provision to the
states in the same way the provision was interpreted for federal criminal cases.46
42 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
43 See generally William Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761
(1961).
44 See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV.
929 (1965) (presenting a mostly critical view of this vision of the Bill of Rights).
45 See David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 542-43 (1992)
(explaining how large-scale reform efforts can be facilitated by code-like rules as opposed to
standard-based norms).
46 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 45 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); see also George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145 (2001) (arguing that the
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This approach does not readily take into account the real differences between the
federal and state systems and fails to account for "for growth and vitality, for
adaptation to shifting necessities, for wide differences of reasonable convenience
in method.*A
7
Formalism, too, has advantages and disadvantages. As my colleague David
Strauss has explained, one benefit of formalism to reformers is that the method can
provide judges with a cover under which to engineer reform.48 If the Bill of Rights
creates a set of rules, and if the rules prohibit a practice, then judges can mandate
that a challenged practice must cease simply by applying the rules. Period. A
judge or justice can come to such a conclusion without condemning or praising the
practice at issue because she is simply relying on the rules to dictate the outcome
in a particular case. She is not responsible. Reform under these circumstances is
much more palatable than the world in which a decision-maker must take more
personal responsibility for overturning a regime.
This benefit of formalism, like the benefit of prophylaxis, may also be costly.
The text of the provisions mandating rules rarely provides the easy answers that its
proponents claim that it does, for the language to be relied upon is rarely
determinate. In the process of construing relevant texts, formalists can become
susceptible to the identical criticisms that they freely lobbed at their anti-formalist
foes. But the Warren Court formalists claimed that their method was different.
Formalism was supposedly superior to the Frankfurter/Cardozo method of
constitutional interpretation because it was simply rule-interpretation-something
judges are supposed to be good at doing-as opposed to judicial judgments
regarding broad concepts of "ordered liberty."
Another cost of the Warren Court approach is that it left little room for
explicit evaluation of racially-discriminatory and unfair criminal justice practices.
Given the context in which the Court was operating, its failure to be more
forthcoming about the racial dimension of its criminal procedure cases is not
surprising. The Court's strategy in this respect was not limited to criminal
procedure. Harry Kalven, in his classic The Negro and the First Amendment,
documented the contribution that this strategy made to modern free speech
jurisprudence.49 The Court's death penalty jurisprudence in the late 1960s and
Court's method of applying Bill of Rights provisions to the states and to the federal government in
equal measure has resulted in an unnecessarily cramped interpretation of rights applicable to
defendants in federal criminal cases).
47 Friendly, supra note 44, at 954 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court Writes a
Chapter on Man's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1932, reprinted in FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS
192-93 (1939)).
48 See Strauss, supra note 45, at 546.
49 HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965). Kalven saw the
positive influence of the civil rights movement on the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence as
counteracting the negative influence of McCarthyism on it. See id. at 6 ("[W]e may come to see the
Negro as winning back for us the freedom the Communists seemed to have lost for us.").
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early 1970s, including its decisions in Furman v. Georgia, and Coker v.
Georgia,51 likewise reflected a (largely) unspoken concern with race. 2 The Court
reached outcomes to be admired in many of these cases, but it is not clear that the
text of the Bill of Rights mandated its conclusions. One problem with the
formalist conception of the Bill of Rights as a code is that "it raises the question of
the extent to which manipulatively false rhetoric is permissible in public life.
' 53
This last point brings me back around to the arguments about public-regarding
justice that I offered above. I think it is fair to say that the Court's emphasis on
formalism in its interpretation of the Bill of Rights distracted it from specifying
normative constitutional values in the criminal procedure arena relevant to
addressing racial injustice. In the early criminal procedure cases, attention to racial
injustice was fairly central to the due process determination. Over time and
because of the selective incorporation approach, discussions of public-regarding
justice that were a regular feature of the Court's early fundamental fairness
decisions, became rarer and even, at least according to the Court, disfavored.
5 4
This is not to say that the Supreme Court relegated analysis of fundamental
fairness in due process to the trash bin. In an important class of cases, the Court
has continued to rely on the Due Process Clause to specify fair procedure in both
the pre-trial and post-trial context.55 Indeed, examination of the corpus of these
cases makes it quite difficult to conclude that free-standing due process has only
the most narrow applicability, as the Court has stated. 6 What is different today is
that the Court has tended to emphasize adjudicatory fairness 57 --the value of
procedure as a sorting mechanism-to the exclusion of the robust and vigorous
assertions of the values of public-regarding justice that characterized the
Frankfurter and Cardozo era. Moreover, and importantly, the Court has failed to
utilize the fundamental fairness doctrine in cases implicating racial injustice in the
criminal justice system when it would make sense to do so.
50 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
51 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
52 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 330-32 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that race played a role in Furman and Coker decisions); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REv. 355, 376 (1995).
53 Strauss, supra note 45, at 548.
54 See Jerold H. Israel, Freestanding Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303, 389 (2001) (noting that the
Court has stated explicitly its desire to narrow the category of infractions to which fundamental
fairness analysis can apply).
55 See id at 389-99 (providing a detailed catalogue of relevant decisions).
56 See id. at 398.
57 See id at 397 n.549 (listing cases).
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III. ASSESSING THE WARREN COURT'S LEGACY IN LIGHT OF LEGITIMACY-
EVERYTHING OLD Is NEW AGAIN?
I want to emphasize at this point that I believe that concern for the rights of a
criminal defendant is critical to evaluating the constitutionality of the group of
procedures that make up the process by which we identify, charge, convict, and
punish an offender. I also believe that that this conclusion ought not crowd out the
fact that the body politic has interests-indeed rights-to due process in criminal
justice operations. When we focus inordinately on criminal defendants, we lose
sight of the other participants in the theater of criminal justice-the audience. The
public is critical to the system's proper function, but a focus on the individual
rights of the defendant to the exclusion of the interests of other participants belies
the public's critical role.
Elsewhere, in an analysis of the criminal defendant's right to self-
representation, I have explained how promoting the interests of the criminal
defendant to the exclusion of the public's interest in a fundamentally fair criminal
trial 5?rocess has led to a state of affairs that neither defendants nor observers find
fair. Here, I'd like to return to a theme I set out early in that other piece. I hope
to show that an application of the Court's pre-Warren Court fundamental fairness
jurisprudence would likely have allowed the Court to more transparently and
effectively address issues of race in two areas of criminal justice in which race is
commonly implicated-petit jury composition and selective prosecution claims.
A. Jury Composition
The Supreme Court's earliest review of practices governing state criminal
trials concerned race discrimination in jury selection.5 9 However, this is not to say
that the Supreme Court created a scheme in these early cases to regularly enforce
its prohibition against race discrimination in jury selection. That is why Batson v.
Kentucky6 ° is recognized as a watershed case. In Batson, the Supreme Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on
the basis of race, and that evidence of race-based jury selection from a single case
is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.6'
58 See Meares, supra note 3.
59 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226
(1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
60 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
61 It is the second part of Batson's holding that is important. Id. at 84-89. Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965), which was overruled by Batson, maintained that an equal protection violation
could not be demonstrated unless there was evidence that a prosecutor engaged in race-based jury
selection in several cases over time.
[Vol 3:105
EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN
In Batson, an African-American defendant challenged the exclusion of
African-American jurors from the jury that was to decide his case. Although the
interests of the excluded jurors were not explicitly on the table, the Court
nonetheless pointed out:
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the
accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try....
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire
community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black
persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our
62system of justice.
Batson was not the first case in which the Court made prominent the interests
of the public in juries composed with procedures free from discrimination. A little
more than a decade before Batson, the Court addressed a similar issue in Peters v.
Kiff.63  Peters, unlike Batson, was not an equal protection case. While the
constitutional foundations of Peters are somewhat muddy, the best explanation of
the result in Peters is that it was mandated by due process considerations.
In Peters, the defendant, who was white, challenged his conviction for
burglary based on the fact that African-Americans were excluded from both the
grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him. Justice Marshall
and Justice White, each writing for a three-member plurality, clearly agreed on one
aspect of the case: The problem with upholding Peters' conviction was not that the
failure to include Blacks on the juries somehow biased the outcome in the case;
rather, the problem with the conviction was the illegality of the selection process.64
Justice Marshall's opinion notes:
The essence of the petitioner's claim is this: that the tribunals that
indicted and convicted him were constituted in a manner that is
prohibited by the Constitution and by statute; that the impact of that error
on any individual trial is unascertainable; and that consequently any
indictment or conviction returned by such tribunals must be set aside.65
This conclusion is not obvious. Typically a petitioner must assert some cognizable
harm in order to seek relief before the Court. This is the essence of the Court's
standing doctrine. Because Peters was white, he could not claim that his own
62 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (citations omitted).
63 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
64 See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is
It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 739 (1992) ("illegality, and not partiality, was the defect
identified by both factions in the majority").
65 Peters, 407 U.S. at 496-97.
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equal protection rights were infringed by the prosecutors' actions. Justice Marshall
had an answer to this conundrum. He pointed to the interests of the excluded class
of black jurors, and concluded that they were denied "the privilege of participating
equally . . . in the administration of justice" and were stigmatized by the
government's actions in the case.66 Most importantly for our purposes here, in
making these arguments Justice Marshall relied upon cases such as Tumey,67 which
established the importance of the appearance of a just tribunal grounded in due
process. Justice Marshall asserted in Peters that "[i]llegal and unconstitutional
jury selection procedures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process.
They create the appearance of bias in the decision of individual cases, and they
increase the risk of actual bias as well. 68 Justice Marshall's plurality did not
require Peters to identify a specific way in which the illegal jury composition
affected the outcome in his case. It was enough that the illegal composition called
into question whether a fair tribunal decided his case.
While Justice White wrote separately for a different three-member plurality,
his opinion, too, exhibits concern about the illegality of the jury composition.69 As
Barbara Underwood has argued, while several commentators have concluded that
Justice White's decision has statutory rather than constitutional underpinnings, a
better reading of the opinion is that it, like Justice Marshall's, sounds in due
process. 70  Justice White's invocation of the federal statute barring race
discrimination in jury composition followed his citation of specific constitutional
language from Hill v. Texas: "Where, as in this case, timely objection has laid bare
a discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, the conviction cannot stand
because the Constitution prohibits the procedure by which it was obtained.",71 This
is due process language.
Given that the Supreme Court ultimately held in Powers v. Ohio72 that
criminal defendants have the right to raise the equal protection interests of
excluded jurors as third parties, one might ask whether it makes sense to focus at
all on Peters and its rationale. The answer is that the approach to race-based juror
exclusion that Peters v. Kiff lays out forthrightly presents a vision of a
constitutional guarantee that has more than one class of beneficiaries, and that is
more consistent with the promotion of public-regarding justice than the Powers
Court's third party standing approach. Peters' construction of the violation at
issue in the case as illegal jury composition inconsistent with constitutional
procedure, and without regard for the particular outcome that such defective
66 Id. at 499.
67 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
68 Peters, 407 U.S. at 502-03.
69 Id. at 506.
70 See Underwood, supra note 64, at 740 (arguing that Justice White agreed with Justice
Marshall's due process holding but invoked federal law in order to limit the holding to race).
" Peters, 407 U.S. at 506 (quoting Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942)).
72 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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composition could produce, makes the Powers Court's third party standing
analysis unnecessary. The Peters Court's approach importantly suggests that the
petitioner was simply asserting a first party right to be governed by a valid
rule 73 -a rule that, when broken, creates a structural defect that all members of the
public have an interest in correcting. This characterization sounds in due
process. 74  It is an argument that rests solidly on public-regarding fundamental
fairness. It is, moreover, an argument that is congenial to the social science of
procedural justice.
B. Selective Prosecution
Now that I have laid out the case for a Batson claim as a due process
argument, the contours of a similar argument for selective prosecution should be
apparent. Selective prosecution claims have long been considered under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 However, the structure of my
argument here is similar to the argument I made above with respect to race-based
jury exclusion. Selective prosecution claims present issues of interest to the
general public as well as to the defendant.
73 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1984)
(explaining that many third party standing cases are more properly conceptualized in first party terms
because the litigant is simply seeking to be regulated according to a constitutionally valid rule).
74 One might ask why the Court didn't adopt Peters in Batson. A straightforward answer is
that the case was not argued that way. The petitioner and supporting amici pushed a Sixth
Amendment violation-that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury that is as
representative of the community as possible-as opposed to an argument calling for Swain to be
overruled. Interestingly, the petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments reveal the cost of formalism to
which I alluded above. At oral argument, J. David Niehaus, on behalf of James Batson, characterized
the Sixth Amendment claim in this way:
[Lower federal courts have] talk[ed] about fairness between the parties, and that it does
tend to diminish the perceptions of fairness in the eyes of the public, and those courts
have perceived a-I guess you would say a right emanating, although not specifically
stated, out of the Sixth Amendment, wherein the courts may impose the same rule on the
defendant in order to bring out the confidence necessary for...
Oral Argument, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (J. David Niehaus for Petitioner).
The Court ultimately emphasized equal protection by itself, however. It could just as easily
have emphasized the Due Process Clause. Why equal protection? I have several thoughts, all of
them speculative. The Court could have simply thought that as a race discrimination case, equal
protection was more suited to the problem. Certainly, there was a long history of addressing claims
of race discrimination outside of the criminal justice context through the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. A more complicated version of the last point is that the Court may have
believed that equal protection limited the reach of Batson in a way that a due process argument would
not. In other words, had the Court simply characterized the problem in Batson the way that I have
above, it is not clear that the violation could be confined to race. Indeed, by the terms of the
argument, it should not be so confined.
75 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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At first glance it might appear that my conclusion is less straightforward than
the jury composition argument. After all, when a criminal defendant accuses a
prosecutor of unconstitutional selection, it is not obvious that the prosecutor has
engaged in conduct that directly affects a third party participant of the criminal
process. That impact obviously takes place when a prosecutor excludes a juror
because of her race. That said, one can argue that a selective prosecution claim
presents a clearer case of public-regarding justice than a Batson claim does. This
is because jury exclusion can implicate the outcome of a case in ways that suggest
that the Batson problem is about biased deliberation as opposed to merely illegal
composition. Some have argued that a juror's racial identity potentially affects the
outcome of a case because it is possible that jurors are more likely to acquit
defendants of their same race (or convict someone of a different race).76 Or, we
might think that racially heterogeneous juries will produce different outcomes than
more homogenous ones.77 In contrast, when a person raises a selective prosecution
claim, the success of the petitioner's argument does not depend on a connection
between the prosecutor's selection and the ultimate harm-the conviction. There
is nothing about the argument that implies that the prosecutor, say, will concoct
evidence to insure that the chosen offender will be prosecuted. The harm is in the
process itself. Notwithstanding the defendant's guilt, the argument goes, the
prosecution is defective because the methods and procedures the prosecutor used
to single out the particular defendant are unfair.
Note the similarities between this argument and the procedural justice
literature summarized above. Selective prosecution might be inconsistent with
procedural justice because the decision-maker has selected an offender to charge in
a way that is not perceived as neutral. If a prosecutor selects someone for
prosecution, even someone who is guilty, on the basis of an irrelevant factor such
as race, observers might conclude that she cannot be counted on to act fairly and
benevolently in the future. Simply put, the public does not want prosecutors to be
the "architect[s] of injustice ' 78 at the inception of the criminal process.
76 Social psychologists refer to this phenomenon as "ingroup-outgroup bias." If a juror has a
common bond with the defendant, such as race, in-group bias suggests she is more likely to view him
positively than someone who does not share this bond. In fact, someone of a different race from the
defendant is likely, due to out-group bias, to view him negatively. See William T. Pizzi, Batson v.
Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 SUP. CT. REv. 97, 129-30 (explaining
ingroup-outgroup bias, its application to race-based peremptory challenges, and citing relevant social
science research). Also consider the controversy over the jury composition of the first so-called
"Rodney King" trial-the state trial of the officers who beat Rodney King. For an especially pointed
critique of the verdict produced by the mostly white jury, consider Steve Greenberg's editorial
cartoon depicting a black man surrounded by white, blindfolded Ladies Justice beating the man with
their scales. Steve Greenberg, The Rodney King Verdict, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 2,
1992, available at http://www.greenberg-art.com/.Toons/.Toons,%20favorites/RodneyKing.html.
77 See, e.g., Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal to Advance Both the
Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1988 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 166 (citing studies).
78 The phrase is a shortened version of a phrase from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88
(1963) ("A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available,
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Concerns about selective prosecution may be especially acute when
prosecutors exercise their discretion in ways that people perceive to be racially
biased. Studies have consistently reported that minority communities perceive
higher levels of bias in the legal system than non-minority communities.79 Tyler
and Huo's fine-grained analysis of minorities and procedural justice shows that
minority respondents were more likely to say that they had received unfair
outcomes in their experiences with authorities, to say that the procedures used by
authorities were unfair, and to express low levels of trust in the motives of
authorities.80 Despite these findings, Tyler and Huo's analysis points to the
conclusion that minorities care deeply about process issues.81  That is, the
evaluations of both minority and non-minority groups of police and courts (and
presumably prosecutors) depend a great deal on the fairness of the treatment that
they feel people receive from these authorities as opposed to outcomes.82
How does this work help to reconceptualize selective prosecution claims?
Consider United States v. Armstrong.83 The case concerns five black defendants
who were charged in federal court for distribution of cocaine base, or "crack." At
the time these defendants were indicted in the Central District of California,
federal law provided for a minimum penalty of ten years in prison with a
maximum penalty of life if a defendant was convicted of distributing more than
fifty grams of crack. Simultaneously, California law punished the identical
conduct with a three to five year prison term. The defendants in Armstrong
contended that federal prosecutors in the Central District of California targeted
them for prosecution because of their race. They argued that had they been of a
different race, they would have been prosecuted in state court. The case reached
the Supreme Court after the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the
prosecutors to respond to the defendant's discovery request seeking the criteria by
which the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California chose crack
cases for prosecution in federal court.
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision, stating that the
defendants had "failed to show that the Government declined to prosecute
similarly situated suspects of other races, 84 and therefore failed to clear the
would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the
defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport
with standards ofjustice .... ").
79 See Richard R. W. Brooks & Haekyung Jeon-Slaughter, Race, Income, and Perceptions of
the US. Court System, 19 BEv. Sci. & L. 249, 251 n.7 (2001) (collecting cases).
80 See TYLER & Huo, supra note 26, at 148-49.
81 See id. at 155-56 ("White respondents are especially likely to rely on their assessments of
the process, in comparison to minority respondents.... [However,] as with whites, the favorability of
outcomes is not the most important determinant of the willingness to accept decisions in either of the
two minority groups.").
2 See id.
83 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
84 Id. at 458.
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threshold showing for discovery. The defendants had presented the district court
with affidavits summarizing evidence that white offenders were prosecuted in state
court rather than federal court, but the Court held that this evidence was
insufficient to entitle the defendants to discovery.
What is important for my argument is the extent to which the Armstrong
Court's decision not to allow the defendants to have discovery is inconsistent with
promoting procedural justice. I will argue that greater attention to public-regarding
justice grounded in fundamental fairness could provide a foundation for ruling in
favor of the claimants in Armstrong.
One of the key aspects of procedural justice is its attention to procedure, not
outcomes. Accordingly, with respect to Armstrong, the issue of importance in the
case is not whether the Armstrong defendants should have ultimately succeeded on
their substantive claim; rather, the issue is whether they should have been allowed
access to the kind of information that would have made their pursuit of the claim
possible. The Armstrong Court set the bar for access to discovery very high. After
Armstrong, to obtain discovery, a defendant must provide some evidence of
similarly situated unprosecuted people. This requirement for access to
prosecutorial information is incredibly-possibly unattainably-high.
Richard McAdams has offered one defense of the Court's requirement. It
might make sense to limit discovery to those cases in which there is a reasonable
basis for inferring that race and the decision to prosecute are correlated.85 If a
petitioner can establish a reasonable basis for success, then it is easier to justify the
cost to prosecutors of providing defendants with information to substantiate their
selective prosecution claims. Even if Professor McAdams is correct about the
importance of correlations to the Court, the most elementary student of statistics
knows that satisfying the Armstrong test still makes it impossible to determine that
race and prosecutions are correlated.86 One cannot determine whether race and
prosecution are correlated simply by knowing how many Blacks and Whites are
prosecuted. One also needs to know how many in each group are not prosecuted.
The Armstrong Court required the claimants to provide information about similarly
situated white defendants who were not prosecuted-only one of the necessary
groups. 87 If all of this is correct, then it is difficult to understand why the Court
would require defendants to produce evidence that is so hard to obtain to garner
discovery when the discovery would not prove very helpful.
The most likely explanation for the Armstrong Court's high discovery bar is
its desire to radically limit selective prosecution claims. I submit that this desire
misconceives the importance of promoting public-regarding justice. The
perception of selective prosecution is a real problem regardless of the actual
incidence of the offense, as the studies cited above suggest. In light of such
85 See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of
Armstrong, 73 Cffn.-KENT L. REv. 605, 629-30 (1998).
86 See id.
" See id. at 634.
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perceptions, prosecutors could do well by promoting transparency by turning over
the evidence selective prosecution claimants seek. 8  Being open would
communicate to the public that they have nothing to hide.
89
In order to promote public perceptions of fairness, the Armstrong Court could
have drawn on the Court's fundamental fairness jurisprudence to recognize that
more was at stake than the particular defendant's interest in being singled out by
the prosecutor. A Court concerned with public-regarding justice would have more
readily required the trial judge in Armstrong to allow discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
I am a great admirer of the Warren Court. Its goals were righteous, and many
of its outcomes are justly celebrated. My goal here is not to undermine the work,
but to reflect on it. In particular, I have emphasized the gradual weakening of
fundamental fairness analysis in due process as a mechanism for the creation of
constitutional criminal procedure. In the old days, fundamental fairness was used
to establish procedures protective of criminal defendants. Importantly, though, the
Court, in relying on fundamental fairness recognized that the Due Process Clause
is a constitutional guarantee that includes the interests of all of us, not just
defendants. Fundamental fairness promoted a vision of public-regarding justice.
Today these public-regarding ideas are more dim than they used to be because the
Bill of Rights has become the central mechanism for the articulation of
constitutional criminal procedures.
It is true that the fundamental fairness jurisprudence likely was not well-suited
to produce rapid and widespread reform of state criminal justice practices
compared to selective incorporation. However, we obtained reform at a cost. The
Warren Court's selective incorporation approach did not admit of the candid
evaluation of various aspects and practices of the states that fundamental fairness
analysis did. That analysis captured society's normative aspirations and provided a
primer on fair treatment of citizens. We are in dire need of a remedial course.
Despite the Warren Court's work, racial injustice still appears to pervade the
operation of criminal justice systems around the country. Attention to the
appearance of injustice, social science research has shown, is one of the most
important ways for a criminal process to achieve public trust, participation, and
compliance. Perhaps, in pursuit of these goals, we should allow the old to become
new again.
88 Compare Justice Stevens' statement in Armstrong: "Federal prosecutors are respected
members of a respected profession. Despite an occasional misstep, the excellence of their work
abundantly justifies the presumption that 'they have properly discharged their official duties."' 517
U.S. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
89 Note the similarity between this argument and arguments prosecutors might make (at least
want to make) concerning whether or not a criminal defendant testifies at trial.
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